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OBSCENITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
THE SEARCH FOR AN ADEQUATE TEST
IN A recent decision, Roth v. United State, the United States Supreme
Court was confronted with the dilemma with which state and lower
federal courts have long been struggling-namely, what is obscene, and
to what extent may it be proscribed. Having declared that the area of
constitutionally-protected speech does not encompass obscenity,2 the
Court, nevertheless, indicated an awareness of the dangers inherent in
such a broad rule and asserted that the standards for judging obscenity
must, in order to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity, ensure
the protection of that material which is, in fact, bona fide in purpose,
although it may, perhaps, tend to stimulate sexual thoughts.8 Mr.
Justice Brennan, speaking for a majority of five, attempted to provide
such a standard: "whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest."4
The judicial search for an adequate obscenity test began with the
English case of Regina v. Hiclklin,5 wherein Cockburn, C.J., declared:6
1 354 U.s. 476 (x957).
'Id. at 485. This assertion comes as no surprise, for as Justice Brennan notes,
until this case the Supreme Court had always assumed that obscenity was not consti-
tutionally protected. This assumption arose from dicta in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S.
727 (1877) where, while holding constitutional a federal statute prohibiting the use
of the mails to advertise a lottery, the Court indicated by analogy that a Congressional
act against depositing obscene matter in the mails was equally not in violation of the
first amendment. Said the court, "In excluding various articles from the mail,
the object of Congress has not been to interfere 'with the freedom of the press, or
with any other rights of the people; but to refuse its facilities for the distribution of
matter deemed injurious to the public morals." Id. at 736. Subsequent cases have
likewise indicated that obscenity legislation is not unconstitutional. Beauharnais'v.
People, 343 U.S. 2So, 255-257, 266 (1952); Winters v. People, 333 U.S. 507, 5t0
(1948); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, x58 (1946); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716
(x93x); United States v. Harmon, 45 Fed. 414, 425 (Kan. D.C. 2891 ) ; United States
v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,571, at lo95 (S.D.N.Y. 2879).
a 354 U.S. at 487.
'Id. at 488.
'L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). This famous case involved the seizure (under 2o & 21
Vscr., c. 83, s. z., The Obscene Publications Act of z857) of a pamphlet entitled
"The Confessional Unmasked" which, as a propaganda organ of the Protestant Electoral
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... the test of obscenity is... whether the tendency... is
to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such im-
moral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort
may fall.
Thus, it was determined that the objectionableness of literature was to
be gauged by its effect on those most' susceptible to prurience, on its
possible rather than its probable audience. Nor were the author's in-
tentions to have any relevance.7 Furthermore, because the court found
that only portions of the publication involved were obscene, the case
came also to stand for the proposition that the material need not be
judged as a whole, but rather on the basis of isolated passages charged
with being obscene.8
Union, was an attack on the Catholic Church. The court found that a magistrate's
order that the pamphlet be destroyed was correct in that the pamphlet was obscene.
old- at 37!.
'To defendant's contention that his motive was to prevent the spread and progress
of the Roman Catholic Church and that his intentions were honest, Chief Justice Cock-
burn answered, "May you commit an offence against the law in order that thereby you
may effect some ulterior object which you have in view, which may be an honest
and even a laudable one? My answer is, emphatically no." Id. at 371-372. And
Justice Blackburn of the same court stated, ". . . although the appellant may have
had another object in view, he must be 'taken to have intended the natural consequence
of his act. If he does an act which is illegal, it does not make it legal that he did it
with some other-objeit." Id. at 375.
aIn United States v. Bennett, 4. Fed. Cas. 1093, No. 14,571 (S.1).N.Y. 1879),
defendant's counsel was allowed to read and comment only on those portions of the
material marked by the prosecution as falling within the indictment, although each
member of the jury was provided wvith a copy of the book. In Commonwealth v.
Friede, 17 1 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (193o), the case notorious for declaring unfit
Theodore Dreise's .4* merican Tragedy, the court refused to allow the entire
book to be introduced into evidence and only sections chosen by the prosecutor were
permitted. There, however, the court was laboring under a Massachusetts statute which
forbade the sale of any book'"containing" obscene language. In 1930 this statute was
amended to bar the sale of obscene, indecent, or impure books, and Commonwealth
v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. S43, 6z N.E.2d 840 (1945), although upholding a conviction
for the sale of Strange Fruit, decreed that the book must be viewed as a whole in
judging its obscenity.
Apparently the Hicklin test for obscenity is still applied in England. Regina v.
Reiter [z954] 2 Q.B. z6 (C.A.); Regina v. Martin Secker & Warburg, Ltd. [x954] 1
Weekly L.R. 1138; Paget Publications, Ltd. v. Watson [1952] i All E.R. 1256
(Q.B.). And see Williams, Obscenity in Modern English Law, 2o LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 630 (x955). In the Paget case the lower court found only the cover of the
magazine, Slick Bedtime Stories, to be obscene, yet ordered 13,000 copies of the publica-
tion destroyed. On appeal, Lord Goddard, C.J., in affirming, declared: "It is not
necessary to show that a publication -is obscene on every page. A publication may be
obscene because part of it is obscene." Paget Publications, Ltd. v. Watson, supra at
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American courts soon adopted the Hicklin standard,9 but there were
some misgivings. For instance, in United States v. Kennerley,10 Judge
Learned Hand, although applying the Hicklin rule, felt that it was out
of tune with the times and reduced the treatment of sex "to the standard
of a child's library." . He argued that a modern test should take into
consideration the "candor" a contemporary community was willing to
accept and should be based on the "average conscience," rather than
"the lowest, and least capable. 1'
It was not, however, until the famous Ulysses cases,12 some twenty
years later, that the Hicklin rule was repudiated in this country.13
1257. In -the Martin Secker case, Stable, J., charged the jury with the Hicklin
standard, but directed them to consider it and apply it in the light of modern times.
Regina v. Martin Secker & Warburg, Ltd., cupa. Concerning the English system,
Judge Curtis Bok, in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 127-128 (1949),
states:
The rule of Regina v. Hicklin suited the English, and presumably still does
-not as a satisfying standard but-as an effective policeman to take over and
tone down the situation when the social experimeni threatens to get out of
hand.
Censorship should be the proper activity of the community rather than of
the law, and the community has never been lazy upholding what it believes to be
inherently decent at the moment. .With a legal policeman handy, the market.
place is the best crucible in which to distil an instinctive morality....
This is healthy, for it is the struggle of free opinion: it is not suppression
by law. In the English community the people argue and Hicklin stands guard
in case of trouble. The American method is different: the rule has been
modernized.
*United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, No. 14, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1879);
United States v. Smith, 45 Fed. 476 (E.D. Wis. 1891); Commonwealth v. Friede, 27:
Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930); People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408 (1884). See Rosen
v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 43 (z896), where the court approved the trial judge's
instruction to the jury in terms practically identical with those used by Chief justice
Cockburn. The court added, "In view of the character of the paper ... the test pre-
scribed for the jury was quite as liberal as the defendant had any right to demand."
Ibid.
102o9 Fed. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
11Id. at izx.
s United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. xS (S.D.N.Y. 1933),
aff'd, 7z "F.2d 705 (zd Cir. 1934), involved the controversial novel by James Joyce.
Upon its attempted importation into the United States, the customs collector, pursuant
to Section 305(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 STAT. 688 (1930), 19 U.S.C.
§ -305(a) (x95z), seized the book and the United States attorney instituted proceed-
ings for forfeiture.
" An earlier case, Halsey v. New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, z34
N.Y. x, 136 N.E. 219p (1922) declared that the book involved should be considered
as a whole. Also, in considering whether the book was obscene, the court turned ex-
tensively to the views of critics. The case, however, dealt with the obscenity question
There, the District Court for the Southern District of New York, hold-
ing the material in question not to be obscene, interjected the idea that
the sincerity and artistry of the author should be considered and that the
court must determine the effect of the entire book "on a person with
average sex instincts-what the French would call l'homme moyen
sensuel." 4  On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed and set forth the new beacon for American courts:"5
... the proper test.., is its dominant effect. In applying
this test, relevancy of the objectionable parts to the theme, the
established reputation of the work in the estimation of approved
critics, if the book is modern, and the verdict of the past, if it is
ancient, are persuasive pieces of evidence ...
As a result of these cases, therefore, literary and other social values of
the work were to be taken into account, and no longer was the effect of
isolated passages on those most susceptible to prurience to be controlling.
Most of the subsequent American decisions have followed the Ulysses
standard,' although some courts still seemed to adhere to the Hicklin
language.17
in an oblique fashion in as much as the court was concerned with an appeal from ajudgment for the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution case.
6 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
is 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934).
16Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.zd 5x (D.C. Cir. 1945); Parmelee v. United States,
113 F.zd 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940 ) ; United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936) ;
New American Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio
1953); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A.2d 47 (1953) ; People
v. Gotham Book Mart, 158 Misc. 240, 285 N.Y. Supp. 563 (Mag. Ct. 1936); People
v. Miller, 155 Misc. 446, 279 N.Y. Supp. 583 (Mag. Ct. 1935); State v. Lerner, 51
Ohio LAbs. 3±, 81 N.E.2d 282 (C.P. 1948)5 Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa.
D. & C. ioX (1949), aff'd sub. nom. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super.
120, 7o A.2d 389 0950).
"' Burstein v. United States, 178 F.2d 665 ( 9 th Cir. 1949) 5 United States v. Two
Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Calif. 1951), aff'd sub nom. Besig v. United
States, 208 F.zd 14± (9 th Cir. 1953), these cases finding Henry Miller's Tropic of
Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn obscene and unimportable under Section 305 of the
193o Tariff Act, 46 STAT. 688 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1952) ; Hadley v. State,
2o5 Ark. 1027, 172 S.W.2d 237 (1943); King v. Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 741, 233
S.W.2d 521 (195o).
For a more complete treatment of the development of obscenity law in the American
courts, see Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Consti-
tution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 29s (i95.), portions of which are recapitulated in Lockhart
& McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 2o LAw & CoNThMP. PROB. 587 (1955); Alpert,
Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1938). The follow-
ing decisions also contain a -more detailed analysis of the cases: Commonwealth v.
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In the Rotb case, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower
courts, in finding the material in question obscene, had "sufficiently fol-
lowed the proper standard."" But the majority opinion creates some
confusion as to just what the standard is. Justice Brennan's articulation
of the applicable test is replete with the language of the American
Law Institute in its recent attempt to fr"ame an obscenity test along more
modem lines.19 In dissent, however, Justice Harlan noted that the
Institute draters expressly rejected the tests of "tendency to arouse
lustful thoughts and desires" -or "that which 'tends to corrupt or de-
base,' these latter tests being precisely the ones applied in the lower
courts and approved by Justice Brennan.20 This seeming inconsistency
is perhaps clarified by Justice Brennan's footnote assertion that he per-
ceives no important difference between the case law definition of ob-
scenity and that proposed by the Institute.2' Thus, although he employs
new language, he apparently -reaffirms the old definition. 2 This is un-
fortunate both in that it is confusing, and in that it fails to resolve certain
problems that have arisen under the-prevailing case-law standard.
Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. iot (x949) and Bantam Books, Inc. v. Melko, 25 N.J.
Super, 292, 96 A.2d 47 (1953).
354 U.S. at 489-490.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (Tehtative Draft No. 6, 95 7).
20 354 U.S. at 499-500 (dissenting opinion); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 6, 1957) at io.
. 2. 354 U.S. at 487, footnote 2o, wherein it is stated, "'We perceive no significant
difference between ihe meaning of obscenity developed in the case law and the defini-
tion of the Model Penal Code... "
21Others have reached different conclusions. Three justices indicate their belief
that the majority opinion adopted the American Law Institute formula, but they fail to
provide any grounds for their reasoning, save Justice Brennan's use of ALI language.
354 U.S. at 499-500 (Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion) and 513 (dissent of Justice
Douglas, Justice Black concurring). Professor Louis B. Schwartz, Associate Reporter
for the Model Penal Code, theorizes in a recent article that the majority opinion could
have one of three, possible explanations: (a) the majority favor the prevailing formula-
tions and would construe any statute based on the Model Penal Code as not changing
the present rule; (b) that Mr. Justice Brennan "disingenuously" used the Code to
support the lower court instructions on obscenity; or (c) ".. .Mr. Justice Brennan
may have been trying to bring existing law up to the level of the Model Penal Code
by the tour de'force of declaring that it was already there." Professor Schwartz under-
standably prefers the latter hypothesis. Schwartz, Criminal Obscenity LaW, 29 PENN.
B.A.Q. 8, ro-zi (1957). He later concludes, however, that for the purposes of its
decision in Roth, the Supreme Court "does not espouse one or another of the available
definitions but indicates a receptivity to the language of the Model Penal Code." Id.
at 12-13. This conclusion is, perhaps, desirable, but it is hardly acceptable in the face
of Mr. Justice Brennan's own words, note 20 supra, and in light of the fact that in
support -of his test Mr. Justice Brennan cites the Ulysses cases and those proceeding
therefrom. 354 U.S. at 489, footnote z6.
A majority of the courts have, apparently, maintained the idea that
the justification for enforcement of obscenity statutes is the protection of
the public from literature that would likely "deprave and corrupt"
through its tendency to arouse in the reader sexually impure thoughts.
These opinions can be supported only in the light of the unproved as-
sumption that such thoughts will lead to conduct that will contravene
commonly accepted moral standard §.a Thus, most recent critics who
have attacked obscenity legislation and the decisions upholding it have
employed the following rationale: There being no evidence that the
reading of obscene literature leads to abnormal or immoral sexual be-
havior,24 the statutes, which are in derogation of constitutional guaran
tees, are, in reality, punishing literature and those who write, publish,
sell, or distribute it for simply arousing impure thoughts. Some of the
more astute judges, too, have adopted this viewpoint and, accordingly,
seem disinclined to apply the sanctions authorized by obscenity statutes
unless there is substantial proof that reading of the literature involved
has led to or is about to lead to the commission of at least a mis-
demeanor.25 Were this approach generally to be followed, the practical
" See Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution,
38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 329-342, 373-387 (1954).
"See Mr. Justice Douglas's dissent, 354 U.S. at 5o8-$54 and Judge Frank's con-
curring opinion in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, Ss-S8iS (1956), wherein
Judge Frank quotes from and discusses the conclusion of some recent studies on the
effects of obscene writing on human behavior. " Also see Lockhart & McClure, Literr-
ture, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 382-387
(1945); Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROB.
587, 590-598 (19s5) ; Alpert, supra note IS, at 73-75. But see, Schmidt, Justification
of Statutes Barring Pornography from the Mail, 26 FoRDHAM L. REV. 70 6957),
which rather passionately attacks Judge Frank's opinion. Professor Schmidt argues:
"If the reading of great books in the process of education, develops sound intellectual
and moral habits which sooner or later will be, or tend to be, reflected in good char-
acter and conduct, it is a little difficult to understand why the reading of pornographic
books and materials should be free from undesirable cultural and social effects pro-
portionate to their occasion and influence." Id. at 74. His major thesis, however,
is that so long as sociologists, psychologists, and other experts are in conflict as f6
the effect of obscene literature on human behavior, the courts should never consider an
obscenity statute unconstitutional merely because the judges prefer the opinions of one
group of experts over the other. Id. at 95. Professor Schmidt also notes that while the
prevailing obscenity test properly concerns itself with effect on the ordinary adult, the
legislature may be concerned, just as properly, with other groups in the commmunity,
such as nonnormal adults and children; and, therefore, more consideration should be
given legislative intent in enacting obscenity statutes. Id. at 83-88.
"Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent in Roth states, "By these standards punish-
ment is inflicted for thoughts provoked, not for overt acts nor anti-social conduct.
This test cannot be squared *ith our decisions under the first amendment . . . speech
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result would be nonenforcement of obscenity statutes, unless scientific
evidence of causal connection between reading and acting could be ad-
duced. Nevertheless, it is a telling argument, and the only answer
would seem to be that the wealth of obscenity legislation at least indi-
cates the presence of a social problem which the courts cannot totally
ignore.
2 7
Several authorities have suggested that the solution lies in less
prosecution and a greater reliance upon public self-restraint. 28  Their
to be punishable must have some relation to action which could be penalized by
government." 154 U.S. at 5o9. And later in his opinion he adds, "Freedom of
expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with
illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it." 1d. at 514. In Commonwealth v.
Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. soi (1949) aff'd sub nom. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum,
166 Pa.-Super. 12o, 7o A.zd 389 (195o), Judge Curtis Bok seems to accept the pre-
vailing law as the proper test for obscenity, but then stipulates that the statute involved
1may then be applied, as an exercise of the police power, only where there is reasonable
and demonstrable cause to believe that a crime or misdemeanor has been committed or
is about to be committed as the perceptible result of the publication or distribution of
the writing in question: the opinion of anyone that a tendency thereto exists or that
such a result is self-evident is insufficient and irrelevant. The causal connection between
the book and the criminal behavior must appear beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at
x56. Judge Frank, likewise troubled by the constitutional questions raised by obscenity
legislation and prosecution, states in his lengthly concurring opinion to United States
v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 8o-8a7 (2d Cir. x956), that he is inclined to agree with
Judge Bok, although he would modify the application to situations where it could be
shown that this type of book would probably produce anti-social conduct which by
statute could be made a crime. Id. at 826.
"'The federal government and every state, except New Mexico, have statutes pro-
hibiting obscene literature. Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and
the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. Rrv. 295, 324 (1954). And New Mexico has a
statute giving the various localities the power to enact obscenity laws. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 207.10 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957) at s.
'See Alberts v. State of California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), wherein Mr. Justice
Harlan, concurring, states: "Clearly the state legislature has made the judgment that
printed words can 'deprave or corrupt' the reader--that words can incite to anti-social
or immoral action. The assumption seems to be that the distribution of certain types
of literature will induce criminal or immoral sexual conduct. It is well known, of
course, that the validity of this assumption is a matter of dispute among critics, sociol-
ogists, psychiatri5ts, and penologists. There is a large school of thought, particularly in
the scientific community, which denies any causal connection between the reading of
pornography and immorality, crime, or delinquency. Others disagree. Clearly it is
not our function to decide this question. That function belongs to the state legislature."
Id. at 5ox. See also United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 798-799 (2d Cir. x96).
Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 2o LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 587, 596
(x955), concludes: "The courts can hardly be expected to withhold enforcement and
application of obscenity laws to literature until some dependable scientific studies have
been made . . . The courts have the responsibility for giving some meaning and
effect to this legislation, despite its lack of precision. .... "
""See 354 U.S. 476, 514 (dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas); 237 F.2d 796, 823 (2d
argument is that this approach avoids the difficulties and dangers present
in any attempt to frame and enforce an acceptable standard in this field.
There are grave doubts, though, that private censorship and action,
with all of its vigilante connotations, would be a fairer or more satis-
factory method than the one now utilized, which at least grants an open
judicial hearing-'
Perhaps the best approach would be the formulation of an obscenity
standard which would encompass, if not in definition, at least in applica-
tion, the more astute analyses of judges and scholars, and which would,
at the same time harmonize the traditionally high value placed on the
freedom of expression, thus preserving for legislatures the broad policy
decision as to the need for prohibitions against obscenity.80 Indeed, this
may be the only approach possible now that the Roth decision has made
many of the constitutional arguments somewhat academic.
The American Law Institute sets forth this formula for the de-
termination of obscenity:"'
A thing is obscene if, considered as. a whole, its pre-
dominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid
interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if its goes substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in description or representa-
tion of such matters... Obscenity shall be judged with reference
to ordinary adults ....
Cir. 1956) (Judge Frank's -concurring opinion); and Judge Bok's notions, note so
supra. See also Alpert, supra note 17, at 73-76.
"'The authorities who argue for public self restraint, note 28 supra, probably
conceive a system whereby people exercise individual and independent judgments as
to what they shall read. Assuming this to be so, the idea of self-restraint is appealing.
The trouble lies in the fact that invariably people of like minds band together to inflict
their standards and judgments upon the entire community through pressure, blacklists,
and boycotts. Often such extra-legal methods prevent the community from knowing what
material it is not having an opportunity to read. See Lockhart & McClure, Literature,
the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295, 302-320 (1954)
for an insight into some of the methods employed by various existing citizen groups
in this field. The abolishment of obscenity legislation might well be taken as a tacit
encouragement of such private censorship methods, a system far more abhorrent than
that exercised by the courts. Id. at 309; MODE.L PENAL CODE § 207.xo (Tentative
Draft No. 6, 1957) at 9.
30 See notes 26 and 27 supra.
a"MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957) at i. The drafters
also provide that if the material appears to be designed for children or some other
"specially susceptible" audience, it shall be judged with reference to that special group.
Id. at 1-2. And see the comment, id. at so, and the further discussion of the pre-
vailing tests of effect on the-reader and the proposed test of ALI, id. at 19-4o.
19581 NOTES
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
To prove these elements, the Institute would allow evidence tending
to show: (A) the character of the audience to which the material is di-
rectedl (b) the appeal of the material and its effect, if any, on behavior;
(c) the artistic, literary, scientific, educational or other merits of the
work; (d) the degree of public acceptancei (e) the appeal to prurient
interest or absence thereof in the advertisement of the materiali and,
perhaps, (f) the purpose and reputation of the author, publisher and
disseminator. Expert testimony and testimony from author or publisher
are expressly permitted. 2 In addition, the drafters suggest that while
the jury should not be abolished in this field, the trial judge should be
given more freedom to determine the obscenity of the material for him-
self, and appellate courts should be permitted to make independent
judgments as to the obscenity of the material.83
The Institute states that its definition differs from existing case law
in that it directs its attention "to qualities of the material itself i the
capacity to attract individuals eager for a forbidden look," rather than
to the effect of a book upon a reader's thoughts.84 But the distinction
here may exist not in definition, but in application5 for how is one to
judge the obscene quality of the material without determining its effect
upon thoughts? The Institute assumes that many environmental
factors, including the opposite sex, are likely to arouse or stir lustful
thoughts and desires and that it is impossible to suppress such thoughts,
regardless of the statutes or tests employed 5 Therefore, it is the
$2 Id. at 2, 43-46.
"Ud. at 2-3. The Code would permit the trial judge to acquit if he believes the
material not obscene even if the evidence is such that reasonable men could differ. The
trial judge may seek the advice of psychiatrists, sociologists, and critics in making his
independent judgment. Both defendant-and prosecution may appeal the trial judge's
decision as to obscenity. The provision for de novo appellate review is principally
to prevent local pressures from unjustifiably causing convictions. Id. at 46-49.
Actually, this Proposal was defeated by a small margin of votes at the May 1957 meet-
ing of the Institute, but the Reporter will apparently redraft it in an attempt to meet
objections without changing the principle of more judicial responsibility in this area.
Schwartz; supra note 22, at 1S.
"'MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957) at so.
"As an independent goal of penal legislation, repression of sexual thoughts and
desires is hard to support. Thoughts and desires not manifested in overt antisocial be-
havior are generally regarded as the exclusive concern of the individual and his spiritual
advisors. It is not even clear that complete suppression of pornography would substanti-
ally affect the rate of erotic response in the population. Some believe that obscenity is
largely a subjective experience so that individuals inclined in this direction will derive
sexual stimulation from whatever is available, especially in a society like ours in which
the female -fgure'is commonly employed by advertisers to evoke interest, where perfumes
and textures are widely touted for erotic effect, and where the pervasive theme of mass
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avowed intention of the Institute to reach principally the commercial
"panderer" of literature calculated and designed to appeal to prurient
interest."8 In this sense, the ALI standard is decidedly different from
the case law, for it focuses its attention on the method and conduct of
the "panderer" in creating and providing questionable material for
public consumption and strives to punish him for this condgCt.W But
when the question is raised as to the justification foi" punishment of thes.
persons, one is led to conclude that their conduct is considered repre-
hensible only for the reason that they are disseminating material which
has a tendency to arouse lustful thoughts and that this is, assumptively,
injurious to the community. It may be, therefore, that while the ALI
proposal offers little that is new for an abstract definition of obscenity,
it does limit the application of obscenity statutes to a more definite class
of persons, type of conduct, and kind of literature. In this sense, per-
haps, it less offends constitutional sensibilities by providing greater pro-
tection for that which is legitimate but might have a tendency to arouse
lustful thoughts.
Of greater significance than the matter of definition, then, is the
attempt by the Institute to specify the nature of the evidence which
should be admissible in the determination of what is obscene. In this
regard, the Institute's effort accords closely with other recent attempts
to reform obscenity legislation. 8 Needless to say, much of what the
theater, literature and music is an eroticism that is obvious even while it fails to
transgress the strictest obscenity law that could be envisioned." Id. at 2o. See also
Alpert, supra note 17, at 73, where it is noted that of 409 college women who were
asked what things they found most stimulating, "9 said 'Music,' i8 said 'Pictures,' 29
said 'Dancing,' 40 said 'Drama,' 95 said 'Books,' and 2zi noted very simply 'Man.'
36 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957) at 13-15. The
Code specifically excludes as criminal offenses dissemination to educational institutions
or scientists having special reason to .possess such material. Id. at 3, 16-17.
" Mr. Chief Justice Warren's approach, in his brief concurring opinion in Roth, is
similar. 354 U.S. at 494-496.
" See Society of Authors Draft Bill, A Bill to Amend and Consolidate the Law
Relating to Obscene Publications, House of Commons Bill 56 (1955), a revised and
shorter version of which was debated in the House of Commons in the spring of 1957
and subsequently referred to committee3 New Zealand Indecent Publications Act, 191o,
as amended, § 5, 2 N.Z. PUB. ACTS 346 (191o), 2 N.Z. STAT. 1171 (1954). The
English proposal and the New Zealand statute are set forth in MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 207.10 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957), Appendix 88-95. See also Williams,
Obscenity in Modern English Law, 2o LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 63o, 644-646 (1955).
In June 1957, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a bill embodying the
provisions of the MODEL PENAL CODE, § 207.1o, but at the same time retaining, at
least temporarily, the existing North Carolina statute relating to obscene literature.
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Institute and others propose is not new. Some courts have permitted
expert testimony and other evidence of the type described by the Insti-
tute, and some judges undoubtedly give consideration to many of the
questions upon which such evidence would tend to shed light." But
the suggestion here is that it would be better if, in the future, courts
gave more attention to clarifying not only tests and definitions for
obscenity, but also evidence that is to be admitted and the considera-
tions that are to be weighed in prosecutions for obscenity. Perhaps in
this manner the necessarily broad tests can be suficiently limited in their
application to maintain enforcement of obscenity statutes without in-
fringement upon that most precious right, freedom of expression.
Schwartz, supra note 22, at 13. And see N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, C. 1227 and N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-189 (Supp. 1955).
"Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38
MINN. L. REV. 295, 341-350 (-954).
